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Abstract
The number of commercial banks in Russia increased at a fast pace after the 1988 banking
reform.Manyofthesebankslackedsupervisionandoperatedwithdangerouslylowfundingcapital.
After the 1995 liquidity crisis, many of these banks disappeared. In this paper, we investigate the
determinants of the hazard rates of banks active on the Moscovian deposits market during the
1994–1997 period. We ﬁnd that market share and duration have negatively affected the hazard rate,
while the deposit interest rate has had a positive effect. The market share and interest rate effects
are robust to controlling for ‘ﬁnancial clans’.
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1. Introduction
The banking sector was among the ﬁrst to be confronted with a privatization process at
the start of the transition period in Russia. The Gosbank was split up and privatised except
for Sberbank (savings) and Vneshekonombank (international exchange). Many new com-
mercial banks were founded following the 1988 banking reform. The consequence for the
Russiansavingsmarketwasamassiveentryinthebeginningofthe1990s.Inthemid-1990s,
however, many new banks had to leave the market again, either suddenly or because they
failed to pay the claims of depositors. Buchs (1999) reports that the Central Bank of Russia
withdrew about 1000 bank licences in the 1995–1998 period. These events had a dramatic
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impactonthelivesofmanyRussianhouseholdsloosingtheirdepositsandplansattachedto
it,suchasspendingholidaysabroad,orrebuildingtheirapartment.BernstamandRabushka
(1998) claim that the Russian banking ‘system’ has been collectively insolvent since 1992
and that (privileged) banks have been kept aﬂoat by injections of inﬂationary credit, by
preferred sales of high interest GKO bonds and by sales of shares in state-owned natural
resource ﬁrms at low prices to the banks.
The occurrence of high rates of exit after a period of entry is not uncommon in young
industries. Gort and Klepper (1982) and Klepper and Graddy (1990) report on several in-
dustries in which such a ‘shakeout’ of producers has taken place. However, these industry
shakeoutsweredocumentedonlyfortechnologicallyprogressivemanufacturingindustries.
Klepper (1996) explains such shakeouts occurring by stressing the role of economies of
scale in R&D while Klepper and Miller (1995) discuss the possible role of ‘overshooting’.
Although manufacturing industries have been the main focus of research into shakeouts,
there are exceptions like Fein (1998) documenting the shakeout in pharmaceutical whole-
saling.Thekeyfeaturesofashakeoutbeingasharpdropinthenumberofﬁrmsandavirtual
cessation of entry once the shakeout begins are also found in the Russian commercial bank-
ing industry. Another well-known characteristic of industry life cycles is that young and
small ﬁrms are more likely to exit than their older and larger counterparts (see, e.g. Evans,
1987). In this paper we investigate whether this characteristic also holds for the Russian
commercial banking industry.
There have been quite some periods in the early years of capitalism in which ﬁnancial
crises took place and banks went bankrupt (Canova, 1994). The August 1995 interbanking
crisis in Russia may be compared to those ‘banking panics’. In fact, Canova reports no less
than eight crises during the 1880–1914 period, or about one every 4 years. Each of these
episodes was characterized by skyrocketing interest rates. This was also the case in Russia
during the interbanking crisis. The crisis was at least partly caused by the low entry barriers
(weakenforcementofreserverequirements)fornewcommercialbanks.1 Thequestionmay
remain whether it was a consequence of the massive entry of banks and therefore part of an
‘endogenous’ shakeout process of inefﬁcient saving banks or whether it was a consequence
ofunprofessionalandriskybankpoliciesperse.Byinvestigatingwhichbanksweretheﬁrst
toexitwemaygainaccesstoimportantinformationconcerningtheevolutionoftheRussian
banking sector. This paper uses a hazard rate analysis of banks active on the Moscovian
savings market for this purpose. The number of ﬁrms ‘active’ (licensed) on the deposits
saving market in Moscow almost halved during the 1995–1997 period. This corresponds
closelytotheﬁgurespresentedbyBuchs(1999)foralllicencesofcommercialbanksissued
by the Central Bank of Russia.
Thedatasetusedinthispapercoverstheperiodfromthebeginningof1994tillmid-1997.
Thedatasetendsbeforethe1998RoublecrisiscausingverysevereproblemsfortheRussian
banking system disrupting a normal evolutionary pattern. The focus of the analysis is on
commercial banks performing tasks comparable to those in Western economies, hence
including attracting (household) deposits. Therefore, we exclude the majority of licensed
banks that are no more than money-changing boutiques or that are intimately connected to
1 The possibility of too much entry in the context of banking in transition economies is also discussed by
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one or more large ﬁrms providing cheap funding. In the analysis, we discriminate between
the major (Moscow) banks in which the government (or state-owned enterprises) owned
large stakes and smaller commercial banks. The major banks were privileged in many
respects and, hence, less likely to go bankrupt.2
In Section 2, we discuss the proportional hazard rate model. This model has been used
to predict hazard rates for many kinds of organizations including banks (Wheelock and
Wilson, 2000). In Section 3, we discuss the hazards of Russian banking and derive our
hypotheses. In Section 4, we discuss our data set of the Moscovian deposits market. The
totalnumberofbanksweconsiderhavingbeenatriskduringthe1994–1997periodwas74,
of which 45 actually exited. Section 5 is used to discuss the empirical results of the hazard
rate analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2. The proportional hazard rate model
We will derive our hypotheses in terms of hazard rates. Therefore, we will ﬁrst brieﬂy
discuss the technique of hazard rate analysis. Hazard rate (or event history) analysis has
been used extensively in the study of organizational mortality (Hannan and Carroll, 1992;
Baum, 1996), new ﬁrm survival (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995) and the probability of
product exit (Greenstein and Wade, 1998; Lunde et al., 1999). In the current paper, we will
apply this method to the discontinuance of licences of Moscow-based saving banks during
the period from the third quarter of 1994 to the second quarter of 1997. The life time of
a saving bank is assumed to start at the date of issue of the licence and to end when the
bank fails to report deposits data, which is followed by withdrawal of the licence by the
Central Bank. Banks that still had their licence at the end of the second quarter of 1997
are classiﬁed as right-censored. The licence duration data can be characterized in terms of
the hazard function. In this section, we will discuss the Cox semiparametric proportional
hazards regression model and the special parametric cases of the exponential, Weibull and
Gompertz regression models.
Let T be a continuous random variable measuring the duration (or age) of a Central
Bank licence. Deﬁne by x the vector of covariates and by β a corresponding vector of
parameters to be estimated. Denote by F(t|x) = P[T ≤ t|x] the distribution function of
duration T. The density and survivor functions are then equal to f(t|x) = ∂F(t|x)/∂t and
S(t|x) = P[T ≥ t|x] = 1−F(t|x). The hazard rate h(t|x) is determined by the ratio of the
density function and the survivor function:
h(t|x) = lim
dt→0






The proportional hazards model proposed by Cox (1972) has the hazard rate equal to
h(t|x) = λ(t)exp(xTβ) (2)
2 Ofﬁcial statistics indicate that the Russian banking sector has been much less concentrated when compared to
other transition economies. See, for example Table 2 in Gorton and Winton (1998, p. 627). However, these ﬁgures
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If we assume that λ(t) has a Weibull parametric speciﬁcation with shape parameter p, then
it equals
λ(t) = ptp−1 (3)
In case p equals one the base line hazard reduces to a constant (of unity) and we get the
exponential parametric speciﬁcation. In case p>1 the base line hazard rate is increasing
over time while in case p<1 it is decreasing. An alternative to the one-parameter Weibull
speciﬁcationistheone-parameterGompertzspeciﬁcation:λ(t) = exp(γt).Incaseofγ = 0,
this reduces again to the exponential speciﬁcation. In case of γ>0, the base line hazard
rate is increasing over time and it is decreasing over time when γ<0. Both the Weibull and
Gompertz speciﬁcations exhibit monotonic hazard rates and are, therefore, well suited to
testfortheeffectofdurationonthehazardrate.Despitethis,thereisanimportantdifference
betweentheWeibullandGompertzspeciﬁcationfornewentrants,atleastintheory.3 Forthe
Weibull speciﬁcation the hazard rate will be inﬁnite for t = 0 in case of negative duration
dependence (p<1) and zero for t = 0 in case of positive duration dependence (p>1).
The base line hazard rate is unity for the Gompertz speciﬁcation when t = 0 (for all values
of γ). There are no strong theoretical arguments to choose either the Weibull or Gompertz
speciﬁcation, so we will choose the speciﬁcation with the best ‘ﬁt’ of the data.
The hazard rate is closely related to the time to failure. We show this for the case of the
Weibull speciﬁcation. An expression for the hazard rate can be found by using regression
on the natural logarithm of duration T. Assume that this regression has the following form:
lnT = xTθ + σW (4)
where θ is a parameter vector, σ a scale parameter and W possesses a standard extreme
value distribution, that is
f(w) = exp(w − exp(w));− ∞ <w<∞ (5)
The ‘disturbance term’ in Eq. (4) does not have expectancy zero, because the expected
value of W equals: E[W] = Γ  (1) ≈− 0.5772. From Eq. (4), one may derive that the





Therefore, the regression approach of Eq. (4) leads to the Weibull speciﬁcation case of
the proportional hazards model with 1/σ = p and θ =− β/p. The expected values of the
duration and its natural logarithm are
E[T|x] = Γ(1 + σ)exp(xTθ) (7)
E[lnT|x] = xTθ + σΓ  (1) (8)
The linear model (4) is sometimes called the accelerated failure-time model. The likeli-
hoods of the accelerated failure time-model and the Weibull proportional hazards model
are identical (except for reparametrization).
3 In this study, the failure data are discrete instead of continuous, so values of t close to zero are not recorded
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3. The hazards of unregulated entry
The development of the Russian ﬁnancial market has been probably the fastest among
transition economies (Buchs, 1999). During a few years’ time an enormous amount of
commercial banks was founded. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(1997)reportedthat“extremelylowminimumcapitalrequirementsinmanyformercentrally
planned economies, set at the equivalence of only a few thousand dollars in some countries,
has resulted in the almost instant proliferation of often miniscule banks.” (p. 84). The
development of Russia’s banking sector was regarded as a success until the 1995 liquidity
crisisandthe1998Roublecrisisshowedsomeimportantinstabilitiesintheﬁnancialsystem.
An important structural reason for these instabilities is that even when the Russian banking
sector was considered unusually successful, no less than four out of ﬁve banks conducted
business with dangerously low funding capital, not hindered by enforcement of reserve
requirements (Buchs, 1999, Section 4.2).4
Theseverityoftheshakeoutphasehasbeenatleastpartlytheconsequenceofthespectac-
ular inﬂow of (registered) commercial banks in Russia following the 1988 banking reform.
The number of commercial banks had increased to around 2500 in 1995 already, many of
them being just money-changing boutiques. It was not so much a question of whether there
wouldbeashakeoutofcommercialbanks.Itwasjustaquestionofwhen.Afterthe1995liq-
uidity crisis, the Central Bank withdrew about 1000 banks licences in 3 years’ time (Buchs,
1999). The fact that many Russian banks were owned by one or a few (client) enterprises,
which used them mainly as cheap sources of credit, also contributed to the instability of
the banking system (Dittus and Prowse, 1996). This structure of bank ownership leads to
a serious conﬂict of interest and has been, as such, a recipe for crisis (European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, 1997).
Massive entry implies that many banks are small and not experienced, the asset portfolio
isone-sidedandthatmanagementmaybeincompetent.Eachofthesereasonscontributesto
the increase of the probability of bank failures. The large majority of new and small banks
fail to achieve a sound market position as they suffer from a liability of newness: “the new
banks will be very risky and prone to failure, not only because of the risk of their loans,
but because private agents such as depositors and established banks will demand premia
if they are to invest in these new banks” (Gorton and Winton, 1998, p. 647). The higher
probability of young and small ﬁrms is a characteristic of many industries.5 A popular
model to explain this phenomenon is Jovanovic’s (1982) passive learning model. He argues
that entrepreneurs are unaware of their (ﬁxed) entrepreneurial ability before entering an
industry and only ﬁnd out after entry. Especially in the ﬁrst couple of years after entry the
4 The 1997 annual report of the Bank of Russia shows the problematic ﬁnancial conditions of many banks
(Statistical Addendum, Table 37, condition on 1st May 1997). Out of 2594 banks there were 706 (27%) whose
licence was revoked. Their total assets amounted to 8% of the total assets in banks. Additionally, there were 540
banks (21%) that were in critical ﬁnancial condition. Their total assets equaled 5% of the total assets in banks.
These ﬁgures show that mostly small banks encountered ﬁnancial problems (at least before the 1998 Rouble
crisis). Bernstam and Rabushka (1998, p. 43) argue that virtually all banks were illiquid and technically insolvent,
according to a 1995 study analyzing the books of 629 Moscow commercial banks.
5 SeeFreemanetal.(1983),Evans(1987),Dunneetal.(1989),AudretschandMahmood(1995)andDavisetal.
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individual ﬁnds out whether his or her ability is relatively high making the ﬁrm to grow or
relatively low making the ﬁrm to exit. We come to our ﬁrst two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. The hazard rate of banks is negatively related to duration—liability of new-
ness.
Hypothesis 2. The hazard rate of banks is negatively related to their size—liability of
smallness.
Soft budget constraints were one of the most important incentive problems in socialist
economies and have remained a major concern in transition economies (Roland, 2000).
The willingness of government to intervene ex post to bail out unproﬁtable banks can be an
important cause of soft budget constraints of banks. An important problem of unregulated
privatizationisthatitislikelytoleadtoexcessiverisk-takingbymanagersincasetheirdown
sideriskispartiallycoveredbyexplicitorimplicitdepositinsurance.Asuccessfultransition
towards a capitalist economy requires hardening of budget constraints to ensure healthy
restructuring of unproﬁtable ﬁrms. Soft budget constraints have been a larger problem in
Russia than in other eastern European countries. For example, the budgetary subsidies
received by enterprises in Russia were about 8% of GDP in 1996 and 1997, while they were
about 2–3% in countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (Roland, p. 288).
Another indication of soft budget constraints in Russia has been the increase in tax arrears.
One measure of excessive risk-taking by savings banks is the level of deposit interest rates
(relative to other banks). In case bank mangers opt for high deposit interest rates they are
also likely to opt for high-risk investments.6 It leads us to the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. The hazard rate of banks is positively related to deposit interest rates.
The 1995 liquidity crisis contributed to a shift in government policy. In 1994, inﬂation
was very high because the government was printing money to combat budget deﬁcits.
Banks were able to earn inﬂation rents transferring centralized credit from the government
to state enterprises and other public institutions (Schleifer and Treisman, 1998, p. 44). In
reaction to the ﬁnancial crisis the government tightened its monetary policy successfully.7
Commercial banks were forced to change their role from transferring subsidies to ﬁnancing
Russian government expenditures through the GKO market (short-term state securities).8
GKOs were attractive to the banking sector because the government paid relatively high
6 By offering interest rates higher than the Sberbank, many new banks were able to attract household deposits
(Litwack, 1998). However, some (small and new) banks offered much higher rates, while others offered rates only
somewhat higher than the Sberbank, indicating difference in the amount of risk-taking by banks.
7 In July 1995, the Russian authorities introduced a ﬁxed exchange corridor for the Rouble versus the US dollar.
The exchange rate remained relatively stable as a result. See Buchs (1999), Chart 1a, p. 695.
8 GKOs are federal treasury bills with a 3–6 months maturity, issued by the Ministry of Finance of the Russian
Federation. The GKO market became increasingly important during the years 1995 and 1996. The total GKO and
OFZnominaloutstandinginbillionRoubelsinJanuaryoftheyears1994–1998was285;15,314;79,997;248,449;
and 390,890, respectively (Source: Russian Economic Trends (RET) of the Stockholm Institute of Transition
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interest rates. The decline of the GKO yield from mid-1996 on was an important reason
for the liquidation of several hundred banks by the Central Bank of Russia (Bernstam and
Rabushka, 1998, p. 73). The changing market circumstances for banks over the sample
period 1994–1997 leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. The hazard rate of banks increased after the government tightened its mon-
etary policy (July 1995).
Banks that were part of one of the “ﬁnancial clans” received a privileged position in
regard to trading in GKOs. These banks were not without any hazard as became all too
clear in the 1998 crisis. An important problem for the large banks was the accumulation of
unpaid debts by ﬁnancially pressed (state) enterprises—the so-called ‘bad loans’ problem.
Nevertheless, the mere inﬂuence (and size) of these banks may have made them likely to
receivepoliticalprotection.Theprivilegedpositionofbanksin“ﬁnancialclans”istranslated
into the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. Banks privileged in regard to trading in GKOs (part of a “ﬁnancial clan”)
had lower hazard rates than other banks.
It could be argued that the ﬁnancial position of the bank is a very important determinant
of the probability of default.9 However, it is very difﬁcult to get accurate information on the
balance sheets of the banks (see Bernstam and Rabushka, 1998). Commercial banks, for
example have seriously underestimated the share of bad assets in their balances. Further-
more, there is little doubt about a causal link from a bad ﬁnancial position to subsequent
exit.Ofmoreinterestarethedeterminantsofabadﬁnancialpositionleadingtodefault.The
hypotheses can also be interpreted in this vein. In Table 1, the ofﬁcial accounts of credit
institutions on 30 June 1995, 1996 and 1997 as published by the Central Bank of Russia
are presented. These ﬁgures would suggest that the banking system was in good and even
improving ﬁnancial shape. The equity of banks was on the rise (even after adjusting for
inﬂation). However, Bernstam and Rabushka (1998) claim that these ﬁgures clearly mis-
represent the true ﬁnancial situation. They derive that not only was equity actually negative
but also decreasing over time (see their Tables 2 and 5).
We concentrate on banks that were actually active (and advertising) on the market for
attracting deposits. This excludes the tiny money-changing boutiques and the dependent
banks set up by one or a few large enterprises. As a result only a relatively small sam-
ple of 81 banks is under investigation. However, these banks fulﬁl at least to some ex-
tent tasks comparable to banking in capitalist countries and are, as a consequence, sub-
ject to similar internal (management) and external (market) forces affecting the chances
of survival.
9 Many studies have analyzed the relationship between ﬁnancial health and failure in the banking industry in
capitalisteconomies.See,forexampleColeandGunther(1995)showingthatbasicindicatorsofabank’scondition,
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Table 1
Analytical accounts of credit institutions 1995–1997 (in billion Roubles)
June 1995 June 1996 June 1997
Reserves 32,918 37,199 50,935
Foreign assets 58,137 52,662 56,549
Claims on general government 34,056 93,403 187,093
Claims on state enterprises 52,801 74,981 72,035
Claims on private enterprises and households 114,503 148,190 179,619
Claims on other ﬁnancial institutions – 1,474 100
Demand deposits 52,746 74,706 104,011
Time and savings deposits 47,415 86,182 109,483
Deposits in foreign currency 60,275 63,460 71,274
Money market instruments 11,345 16,473 23,882
Foreign liabilities 22,303 39,686 67,268
General government deposits 12,907 11,769 20,936
Credits extended by monetary authorities 9,221 8,758 4,260
Undistributed liabilities (sundry) 23,582 14,624 5,010
Capital accounts (equity) 52,623 92,250 140,208
Note:Thetableisbasedontheconsolidatedbalancesheetpertainingtocreditinstitutions,SberbankSavingsBank
and (partly) Vneshekonombank. Source: Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Analytical Accounts of Credit
Institutions in 1995–1997. Available from http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/credit statistics, updated 18 May 2000.
Table 2
Summary statistics
Quarter Exits N(t − 1) Mean exit S Corr(S, INT) Mean INT Std. INT
1994.I −0.56 133 16.3
1994.II 0 39 n.a. −0.40 114 13.4
1994.III 3 48 0.001 −0.30 84 9.4
1994.IV 3 54 0.035* −0.27 65 7.2
1995.I 5 56 0.015 −0.36 84 9.4
1995.II 2 55 0.011 −0.38 112 11.1
1995.III 4 56 0.012 −0.30 96 8.0
1995.IV 7 53 0.004 −0.36 78 6.9
1996.I 2 48 0.038* −0.31 74 10.5
1996.II 3 48 0.019 −0.09 65 9.3
1996.III 7 45 0.008 0.06 62 6.0
1996.IV 3 39 0.007 −0.10 50 5.3
1997.I 5 36 0.005 0.18 36 3.8
1997.II 1 31 0.022 −0.06 26 1.9
Total 45 568
Note: Exits is the number of exits in the quarter. N(t − 1) is the number of incumbents in the previous period.
The Mean exit S is the average of the market shares in the previous quarter of the ﬁrms that exit in the quarter.
An asterisk (∗) means that the average size of the exiting ﬁrms is larger than the average size of the ﬁrms that
remain in the market. The ﬁfth column gives the correlation coefﬁcient between market share and interest rate of
incumbents. The last two columns give the mean and standard deviation of the deposit interest rates offered by the
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4. Data
The data set consists of banks active on the deposits market in Moscow during the
1994–mid-1997 period. A bank is considered ‘active’ when (i) it has got a licence from the
Central Bank allowing customers to open saving accounts; (ii) it advertised at least once in
one of the Moscow newspapers; (iii) it fulﬁlled its obligation to report deposits data to the
Central Bank; (iv) it offered (the very common) 3 months’ Rouble deposits saving accounts
totheMoscowpublic.Thelicencydateofabankisitsentrydate.Thewithdrawaloflicency
date, however, is not identical to the exit date. The exit date is the ﬁrst date for which the
banks fail to report deposits data. Usually the withdrawal of licency follows swiftly (one
quarter)thereafter.ThedatasetwasacquiredbytheACE-projectgroup‘roleofinformation
onRussianindividuals’savingsmarket’(Avdasheva,1998).Dataoninterestrates,personal
deposits and licency dates of the registered banks were derived from Finansovije Izvestia
and Commersant Rating, based on information of the Central Bank of Russia.
In total there are 81 banks recorded to be or to have been ‘active’ on the Moscovian
deposits market. Six of those banks were active on the deposits market at one time or
another, but no information about the size of their deposits portfolio is available. These
banks are removed from the sample. The Sberbank, being the Central Bank of Russia
owned savings bank, is supposed not to have been at risk and is excluded when estimating
the hazard rate equations. This leaves 74 commercial banks that were at risk, of which
45 have exited during the sample period.10 In Fig. 1, we show the Kaplan-Meier survival
estimate for the Moscovian bank industry corresponding to these 74 banks. We ﬁnd that
about 40% of the banks exited within 10 quarters and that about 60% exited within 20
quarters. After 20 quarters of duration no exits are observed and the survivor function is
constant at 0.35. In the ﬁnal quarter, 1997.II, 29 banks (and the Sberbank) remain in the
market and are right-censored (i.e. we are unaware of their date of exit other than that it is
later than 1997.II). In Table 2, we report the number of exits and the number of ﬁrms at risk
in each of the quarters. In addition, we show the mean market share of the ﬁrms exiting.
The number of banks was still increasing during 1994, but the August 1995 liquidity crisis
marked a turning point. After this crisis the number of banks almost halved in 2 years
time. The average size of the banks that exited was small. There have been two exceptions,
though. In 1994.IV, the LLD-Bank (6% market share) exited and in 1996.I National Credit
(7%) exited. In those two quarters the average market share of existing banks was higher
than the average market share.
Before the 1995 liquidity crisis deposit interest rates were high. In Table 2, we show that
the average deposit interest rates were on average 65–133% per annum in that period. The
yield on GKOs (short-term government bonds) was even much higher allowing banks to
make high proﬁts (Warner, 1998). The 1995 liquidity crisis contributed to a shift in govern-
ment policy. In 1994, inﬂation was very high because the government was printing money
to combat budget deﬁcits. Banks were able to earn inﬂation rents transferring centralized
10 In the hazard rate analysis, we require data of interest rates (two quarters lagged) to be available. For ﬁve exits
there is no information for this variable, so the number of exits reduces to 40. Two of these ﬁve banks did have
some(pre-exit)periodsforwhichthevariableisavailable,though.Itimpliesthatforthehazardrateanalysis,there
have been 71 banks under risk, while 40 actual exits have been recorded.264 M.A. Carree/Economic Systems 27 (2003) 255–269
Kaplan-Meier survival estimate
analysis time






Fig. 1. Kaplan-Meier survival curve.
credit from the government to state enterprises and other public institutions (Schleifer and
Treisman, 1998, p. 44). In reaction to the ﬁnancial crisis the government tightened its mon-
etary policy successfully. Commercial banks were forced to change their role from trans-
ferring subsidies to ﬁnancing Russian government expenditures through the GKO market.
GKOs were attractive to the banking sector because the government paid relatively high
interest rates. After the crisis, interest rates dropped steadily over time and in the second
quarter of 1997 the average deposits interest rate was 26% on a yearly basis. The standard
deviationoftheinterestrateshasbeenfallingaftertheAugust1995crisisaswell.However,
the ratio of the standard deviation and the mean (i.e. the coefﬁcient of variation) has re-
mainedrelativelystableovertime.Itshowsthatineachquarterthereisquitesomevariation
in the deposits interest rates offered by banks.
5. Estimating the time to discontinuation: a hazard rate analysis
The hazard rate is assumed to depend upon four separate factors. The ﬁrst factor is
duration.IntheWeibullandGompertzspeciﬁcationcases,thehazardratecanmonotonically
increase or decrease with time present in the market. We expect banks that are present in
themarketforalongertimetohavelowerhazardthanbanksthathaveonlyrecentlyentered
(liability of newness). It implies that in case of the Weibull parameterization p is expected
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negative. The second factor is the time period in which the bank is at risk. The default risk
of saving banks will have increased following the August 1995 interbank crisis when it
became apparent that many banks failed to meet their obligations. That is, the hazard rate
is likely to (temporarily) increase from 1995.III on. We correct for the time dependence of
the hazard rate by incorporating time dummies into the model.
The third factor is the market share of the bank (on the Moscovian 3 months Rouble
deposits market). We expect large banks to be less likely to exit when compared to their
smaller counterparts. This liability of smallness is a common ﬁnding in empirical studies.
We incorporate the reciprocal market share in the previous period, RSHA, as the covariate
measuringtheliabilityofsmallness.11 Wehavedeliberatelychosendepositsdatatomeasure
size instead of total capital data that are less reliable. The fourth factor is the interest rate
offeredbythebank.Banksthatofferratesmuchhigherthanaveragearelikelyeithertohave
a low proﬁt margin or to resort to high-risk investment projects. These banks are likely to
have dangerously low funding capital. The ﬁfth column of Table 2 shows that small banks
were, on average, offering higher interest rates than their larger counterparts except after
the ﬁrst quarter of 1996 when there was little difference between banks with low and high
market shares. We incorporate the ratio of the interest rate offered over the average interest
rate offered, two periods lagged, RINT, as the covariate measuring the risk of offering high
rates. We lag the relative interest rate two quarters because lagging it one quarter would
cost an extra eight exit observations.12 Banks that offer rates much lower than on average
do not have risks similar to the high interest rate banks but appear to have little ambition
to achieve growing market shares. In order to investigate this possibility, we incorporate
RINT in a quadratic form into the hazard rate equation.
The summary statistics for the two explanatory variables for the 536 observations are
as follows. The mean of the reciprocal market share (in the previous period), RSHA, is
279.75. The variable has a minimum of 4.37 and a maximum of 4198.97 and has a standard
deviation of 507.37. The mean of the relative interest rate (two periods before), RINT, is
1.003. It ranges from 0.556 to 1.231 and has a standard deviation of 0.111.
The Grambsch and Therneau (1994) χ2-test on the proportional hazards assumption
has a value of 3.19 (2d.f.) when time dummies are excluded. The corresponding P-value
is 0.20. When time dummies are included the value of the test statistic is 10.57 (13d.f.)
with a corresponding P-value of 0.65. In both cases, the null hypothesis of proportional
hazards cannot be rejected. This implies that we can proceed with the Cox proportional
hazards framework as expressed in Eq. (2). The maximum likelihood ratio estimates of the
parameter vector β and the parameters of the baseline hazard rate can be found in Table 3.
The results were computed using the STREG procedure of Stata 6.0 for Windows.
The estimation results suggest that the Gompertz parameterization is the preferred as-
sumption for the baseline hazard. The estimate for the parameter γ is signiﬁcantly (at
a 5% level) smaller than zero. This implies that the hazard is monotonically declining
11 We have used different measures for the effect of market share (S). The variable RSHA = 1/S outperformed
alternatives like S,1 / S1/2 and 1/S2 in the proportional hazards regression model in terms of explanatory power.
12 The relation between default probability and interest rates goes two ways: banks offering high rates are more
likely to default, but banks which are in a category with relatively high default probabilities are forced to offer
high rates to attract customers. We concentrate on the ﬁrst causal link having interest rates measured half a year
before the possible date of exit.266 M.A. Carree/Economic Systems 27 (2003) 255–269
Table 3
Hazard rate estimation results
Exponential Weibull Gompertz
RSHA 0.00060 (0.00019) 0.00058 (0.00019) 0.00058 (0.00019) 0.00058 (0.00019)




γ −0.103 (0.040) −0.115 (0.042)
logL −47.770 −47.030 −44.865 −43.711
χ2
dummies 30.40 27.39 36.06 37.90
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors have been calculated using the robust method of Lin
and Wei (1989). This is recommended if the same subjects appear repeatedly in the risk pools. Time dummies are
included in all estimations. The χ2
dummies is the likelihood ratio statistic for all constant time effects to be equal
across the quarters. The corresponding number of d.f. is 11. The number of banks that have been at risk is 71, of
which 40 actual exits are recorded. Total number of observations is 536.
with duration. This is also found in case of the Weibull parameterization because p is es-
timated to be below unity. The estimate is not signiﬁcantly different from one, though.
The results suggest that there was a liability of newness in the Moscovian Rouble de-
posits market for the period under investigation. It indicates support for Hypothesis 1.
Time dummies are important in explaining the hazard rate as well. The likelihood ratio
test for the hypothesis that time dummies can be excluded from the model is 36.06 for
the Gompertz case (11d.f.). The lowest coefﬁcients for the time dummies are for the ﬁrst
quartersofthesamplebeforethe1995liquiditycrisisasexpected.Thisprovidessupportfor
Hypothesis 4.
The results also conﬁrm the liability of smallness (Hypothesis 2). The reciprocal of
market share, RHSA, has a signiﬁcantly (at 5% level) positive effect on the hazard rate.
The mean exit share data of Table 2 were already a strong indication for this ﬁnding. The
relative interest rate, RINT, has a signiﬁcant (at a 5% level) effect as well. Banks that offer
high rates are more likely to leave the market than those that offer lower rates. This is in
direct support of Hypothesis 3. We fail to ﬁnd empirical evidence for this relation to have
a quadratic component.
We now turn our attention to Hypothesis 5 claiming that the privileged position of some
banksaffectedtheirchancesofexit.BernstamandRabushka(1998)characterizetheRussian
banking sector of the early-1990s as an Ersatz Banking System, incapable of performing
the role of a commercial banking system in capitalist economies. Many of the banks that
were registered as private corporations were in fact largely government controlled and part
of ‘ﬁnancial clans’. This does not necessarily imply that these banks have not been at risk,
butthatitislikelythatsuchprivilegedbankswillhavebeenprotectedfrombankruptcyeven
if illiquid and that deposits have been covered by a deposit insurance system. We divide the
banks into a group of major banks and a group of other banks. A bank was classiﬁed as a
major bank in case it was assigned by the Central Bank of Russia to be a primary dealer on
the GKO (government bonds) market or to be on the Russian Stock Exchange (RTS). The
13 banks which were classiﬁed as major banks (with year of licency) are PromstroybankM.A. Carree/Economic Systems 27 (2003) 255–269 267
Table 4
Hazard rate estimation results without privileged banks
Exponential Weibull Gompertz
RSHA 0.00046 (0.00020) 0.00046 (0.00019) 0.00047 (0.00019) 0.00047 (0.00020)




γ −0.040 (0.050) −0.054 (0.052)
logL −39.210 −39.204 −38.934 −38.001
χ2
dummies 26.24 17.73 22.62 23.71
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors have been calculated using the robust method of Lin
and Wei (1989). This is recommended if the same subjects appear repeatedly in the risk pools. Time dummies are
included in all estimations. The χ2
dummies is the likelihood ratio statistic for all constant time effects to be equal
across the quarters. The corresponding number of d.f. is 11. The number of banks that have been at risk is 58, of
which 40 actual exits are recorded. Total number of observations is 379.
(1988),VozrozshdeniyeBank(1988),Incombank(1989),ImperialBank(1990),Alfa-Bank
(1992), Avtobank (1992), Menatep-Bank (1992), Toribank (1992), MDM-Bank (1993),
Most-Bank (1993), Promradtechbank (1993), Russian Credit (1993) and Stolichniy Saving
Bank(SBS-Agro)(1993).Noneofthosebanksexitedduringtheperiodunderconsideration.
However,amajorityofthemajorbanksgotintoserioustroublesafterthe1998Roublecrisis.
This included some of the most important market participants like Incombank, SBS-Agro
(Stolichniy), Menatep-Bank and Promstroybank. Hence, the major banks could certainly
be considered to have been at risk. However, these banks were privileged in receiving
political support and may therefore not have been in a position comparable to the other
banks.
Because none of the ‘privileged’ banks exited during the period under investigation, this
may indicate some support for our last hypothesis, at least in the period under investigation.
The amount of support cannot be easily determined in a hazard rate analysis. The reason
is that it is not possible to estimate the expected duration in case no exit is recorded. One
important analysis that can be executed is to consider whether the support for the ﬁrst
four hypotheses is due to the presence of ‘privileged’ banks. To consider this, we exclude
the major banks from the analysis and compare the hazard rate estimation results with
those presented in Table 3. The results with the major banks removed from the sample are
presented in Table 4.
The results in Table 4 show that the Gompertz parameterization fails to outperform the
exponential case as it did in Table 3. The estimate of the parameter γ is insigniﬁcant at the
10% signiﬁcance level. These results indicate that it is difﬁcult to distinguish between an
effect of duration or political protection on the hazard rate: many of the major banks were
also early entrants. The effects of (reciprocal) market share and the relative interest rate are
very similar to those found in Table 3. Therefore, these results appear to be robust against
the presence of ‘ﬁnancial clans’. Small banks offering high interest rates were the earliest
to default among the non-privileged banks.268 M.A. Carree/Economic Systems 27 (2003) 255–269
6. Conclusion
Holding deposits at Russian saving banks has proved to be a risky venture. This paper
ﬁndsthatthelifespanofnewandsmallbankshasbeenlimitedandthatbankswhichoffered
relatively high interest rates on the saving market were likely to be among the ﬁrst to exit.
Many of the small market participants offered interest rates higher than the larger banks to
attractcustomersbutitincreasedthelikelihoodoftheirdefaultinadditiontotheir‘standard’
liabilitiesofnewnessandsmallness.Manyofthenewcommercialbankshadtheirportfolios
being dominated by risky loans made to unproﬁtable Russian enterprises (Buchs, 1999).
People anxious to get high deposits interest rates were, therefore, confronted by a high
hazard rate of losing their money.
The development of the Russian ﬁnancial sector into a system with hundreds of very
young and very small banks barely bothered by enforcement of reserve requirements con-
tributed to its vulnerability.13 The shakeout of almost half of the operating banks in Russia
in the 1995–1998 period showed the extent of the instability that resulted from entry bar-
riers for commercial banking being too low. Many small and medium-sized banks did not
survive the aftermath of the avalanche of bad loans. The entry of new banks was also de-
terred because of the increased public suspicion in respect to banks. The ﬁnancial crisis
has, therefore, fastened the evolution process towards a more concentrated structure of the
Moscoviansavingmarket.Thenumberofﬁrmsdecreasedandthespreadintheinterestrates
of the saving banks diminished as well. In the meantime the Russians had to go through all
the troubles of early capitalism which many Western countries experienced in the late-19th
and early-20th century with an instable banking sector. As the 1998 Rouble crisis in the
Russian banking system was to show, political intervention by the Russian government,
protecting major (illiquid) banks, has not been very helpful to further the transition of the
emergingcommercialbankstowardsmodernbanksasfoundinmarketeconomies,fulﬁlling
the normal role of intermediating household deposits to investing enterprises.
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